Quantum computers powerful enough to break today’s encryption do not exist yet. But banks are already treating that future as a present-day deadline, according to a new analysis published by The Quantum Insider on August 7.
The unexpected concern has a name: harvest-now-decrypt-later. It describes a simple idea. Someone could be copying encrypted financial data today, storing it, and waiting for a quantum computer strong enough to unlock it later. For a payment sent yesterday, that risk might not matter much. But banks hold transaction records, settlement data, and custody information that stay sensitive for years or decades. That is what makes the post-quantum threat sound real.
Post-quantum cryptography refers to new encryption methods designed to resist attacks from quantum computers, replacing the math-based locks that current systems rely on.
SWIFT, the messaging network that underpins most cross-border bank transfers, has responded with a specific target. It aims to make its SwiftNet 8.0 system ready for post-quantum cryptography by July 2027, with a 15-month window for banks to complete the switch.
Regulators are moving in parallel. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority launched a Quantum Preparedness Index in February to score how ready banks in its jurisdiction are for the transition and has now already presented the Whitepaper on Quantum Preparedness of Hong Kong’s Banking Sector. Singapore’s Monetary Authority issued similar guidance in 2024, urging banks to inventory their existing cryptographic systems as a first step.
More than 15 major banks, including JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, BBVA, Barclays, BNP Paribas, and HSBC, now run active quantum computing research programs, according to earlier Quantum Insider reporting. Much of that work targets other uses, like fraud detection and portfolio optimization, alongside preparation for the cryptography shift. Even so, no bank has a quantum computer running in live production yet.
A separate industry study published in June, the State of Quantum 2026 report, found that across surveyed organizations more broadly, only 3% have reached full-scale deployment of quantum systems, even as 89% report some hands-on experience.
That gap between activity and deployment is part of why the migration is treated as urgent rather than optional. Encryption changes of this scale typically take years to plan and execute across a bank’s systems, vendors, and international partners, which is why institutions are starting the work well before any quantum computer capable of breaking current codes is expected to arrive.
The push also has government backing. At a White House quantum summit in July, officials signaled that the federal government intends to be an early buyer of quantum-safe cryptography, following a pattern seen with past technologies where early government purchases helped build the wider market.
